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Abstract
This note develops an overlapping generations model with credit
rationing on research and development, in which both are determined
simultaneously and endogenously. The model provides a useful tool to
examine di¤erent policies that may help alleviate the negative e¤ect
of nancial constraints faced by rms. (JEL D82, D91, D92).
1 Introduction
The link between nancial intermediation and economic growth has concen-
trated a great deal of academic attention during the last two decades. The
empirical evidence, mostly in the form of cross-country studies, has shown
a close positive relationship between the development of banking and the
nancial system on the one hand and economic growth on the other.1
The theory has been developed almost in parallel to the cross-section
empirics. Research in this area has rstly identied the potential chan-
nels through which nancial development could possibly promote economic
University La Sapienza, Rome (Italy). E-mail address: aleaschi@gmail.com.
1For example, King and Levine (1993a) nd a positive and signicant correlation be-
tween bank-credit development and faster economic growth. Similar results have been
obtained in more recent empirical studies (e.g. Rousseau and Watchel, 1998; Rioja and
Valev, 2004).
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growth, either by enhancing the social productivity on investment (e.g. Green-
wood and Jovanovic, 1990), or by increasing the fraction of savings channelled
to productive investment (e.g. Bencivenga and Smith, 1991). Although these
analytical contributions were more realistic in their approach to the problem
than standard models of growth and development along the neoclassical tra-
dition,2 they treated the nancial market in a relatively simple fashion.
The additional issue of the role played by agency costs due to asymmetric
information in weakening economic development would have been taken up in
a second group of papers. Central to this kind of literature is the interaction
between informational asymmetries that give rise to credit rationing and real
growth in an overlapping generations model of any kind.
In this sense, the seminal article of Bencivenga and Smith (1993) is signif-
icant.3 They present a model where they analyze the e¤ect of credit rationing
through an endogenous growth model. In their framework, externalities of
the type presented in Shell (1973) and Romer (1986) are incorporated in
the model via the production technology. Information asymmetries are built
in by assuming that there two distinct groups of agents (high vs low abil-
ity agents) and lenders cannot easily distinguish between the two groups.
Faced with an adverse selection problem, lendersoptimal reaction may lead
them to ration credit. This puts a limit on the attainable growth rate of the
economy. As a consequence, policies designed to reduce credit rationing by
guaranteeing some loans, promote growth, so that there is room for some
policy intervention.
In this note, I intend to further elaborate in this direction. Building on
the work of Bencivenga and Smith (1993) above mentioned, I propose a the-
oretical framework to examine the consequences of asymmetric information
in nancing R&D expenditures.
In fact, it is intuitively plausible that informational frictions are more
severe with regard to rm expected to invest more (or exclusively) in R&D
(hereafter R&D).4 This is due to the unique characteristics of it: long term
in nature, high risk in terms of probability of failure, quite unpredictable
in outcome,5 labour intensive and idiosyncratic. (Holmstrom, 1989) Thus,
2Since, in these models, markets are perfectly competitive and agents symmetrically
informed.
3Similarly, Ma and Smith (1996).
4The relatively few empirical studies on R&D nancing, conrm this hypothesis. See,
for example, Hall (1992) and, more recently, Ozkan (2002).
5A R&D project may not be a technological success, or it may not meet the needs of
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sorting out good and bad projects is more di¢ cult than in more traditional
elds. Furthermore, entrepreneurs have poor incentives to disclose informa-
tion to investors since this might reveal useful for competitors. (Carpenter
and Petersen, 2002; Bhattacharya and Ritter, 1983)
The key point is to show the way credit rationing can a¤ect this rate of
growth, since it a¤ects the level of R&D and therefore innovation. However,
it is not just a problem of substituting R&D expenditure for physical capital.
We need to treat explicitly the R&D and its stochastic nature in a formal
analysis. To my knowledge this is the rst model to specically address this
issue.
The model below endogenizes credit rationing and real growth rates si-
multaneously. Abstracting from Bencivenga and Smith (1993), I will use a
simple non-deterministic production function with just one input (labour)
and where R&D plays a role in such a way that we can avoid diminishing
returns. The function, however, exhibits diminishing returns to labour input.
In this economy, the only investment that takes place is on R&D and these
investments will be nanced only by credit. The rationale for using R&D as
the only type of investment (instead of physical capital) is because I consider
that R&D more susceptible to credit rationing since it cannot be used as a
collateral.6
The model considers also two types of agents: low and high ability indi-
viduals. The low ability individuals have less probability of being successful
in the R&D activity. Lenders in this model, do not have complete informa-
tion about potential borrowers. Hence asymmetric information is present in
this model. This framework show that the probability of getting a loan for
a low ability individual is higher than for a high ability individual. In this
context whenever credit restrictions are present, the group that is more likely
to succeed in R&D activity will face this nancial constraint.
The model provides also a tool to examine di¤erent e¤ects from changes
in parameters.
The paper is organized as follows: section 2 develops the model. Section
3 performs some comparative static exercises. Section 4 concludes.
the marketplace, or competitors may develop a better, cheaper product more quickly.
6Note that a number of theoretical papers (e.g. Basanko and Thakor, 1987; Bester,
1985) have argued that collateral can t as a sorting device (for example between good
risk and high risk borrowers). Since R&D is not a collateral, those theoretical arguments
cannot apply.
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2 The model
2.1 Households
Time is discrete and indexed by t = 0; :::;1. There is a countable innite
number of two-period-lived agents belonging to overlapping generations of
non-altruistic families. The size for all generations is identical. In particular,
at each time t, we have two simultaneous generations: the old generation
and the young generation. Old generation has no labour endowment. Each
young generation is divided at birth into two groups of market participants,
lenders and borrowers. To x ideas, I normalize the size of each generation
to one, of which one-half are lenders and the other half are borrowers, and
each agent has a unit of labour endowment, which I suppose to be supplied
inelastically. I proceed with the formal description of the economy with
reference to circumstances facing agents of generation t.
Young lenders at time t sell their labour to rms receiving the real wage
wt, of which they decide to consume some at time t or to loan to other agents
(borrowers). The utility function of young lenders can be captured by:
U l = cl(1) + cl(2) (1)
where cl(t) is the consumption of lenders (l) at time t = 1; 2.
The utility function of young borrowers (b) is given by:
U b = cb(2) (2)
where cb(2) is the consumption of borrowers at time t = 2.
I assume that lenders do not have consumption good endowment at the
end of the period. Young borrowers also have unit of labour at time t. For
which, they have two di¤erent possibilities. First, they can sell the labour to
the rms and receive (wages) wt. In this case they will store the consumption
goods (wt) until next period t+1, because young borrowers care more about
old age consumption. If they store these consumption goods they will receive
a return i  17 units of the consumption good at time t+ 1.
Or they can allocate the labour unit to operate a R&D project. However,
to exploit such an opportunity, a borrower must acquire consumption goods
7The index i will be dened below.
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q (as a form of "external nance") from a lender of the same generation, in
addition to her own unit of labour.
The result of this project is a stochastic process. They can receive qQ8
units of "innovation" at time t+ 1 with probability pi or zero units of R&D
(innovation) with probability (1  pi).
Young borrowers are divided into two di¤erent groups:
a) High ability to develop the R&D project which can be considered as
"low risk" agents (type L). A fraction of (1  ) 2 (0; 1) are of type L.
b) Low ability to develop the R&D project which can be considered as
"high risk" agents (type H). A fraction of  2 (0; 1) borrowers are of type
H.
The values pi (i = L, H), satisfy:
1  pL > pH  0 (3)
and the i values satisfy:
L
pL
>
H
pH
(4)
Condition (4) implies that L > H ;which means that high ability agents
can obtain a higher return in case they sell their labour endowment and they
store it until period t  1.
2.2 Firms
Young borrowers that operate successful R&D projects become rm owners
to produce nal goods, using labour as the only input to manufacturing.
The productivity of labour will depend on the amount of R&D that they
use. They can rent labour at the competitive price wt and also they can rent
R&D at the rental rate t.
The production function that rms use to produce nal goods (consump-
tion goods) is described by:
Yt = L

t (5)
where 0 <  < 1. The production function that I use exhibits diminishing
returns to labour . However, we have to notice that total output depends on
8Being Q an exogenous technological parameter representing the process of converting
consumption goods (labour) into R&D.
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the amount of labour that is used and also on the value of . I assume that
this parameter can take two values: high (h) with probability P or low (l)
with probability (1   P ), depending on the amount of R&D that the rm
uses. This probability depends on R&D (lets call it "x") and it satises:
P = P (x), P 0(x) > 0, P 00(x) = 0 (6)
We can think of it as a density function to describe P (x) in the following
way: R&D could be expressed as an index of percentage with respect to total
output. In which case the maximum value of R&D or "x" is 1 (or 100%).
Now we can rewrite the production function of nal goods as follows:
E(Yt) = P (x)hL

t + [1  P (x)]lLt (7)
and the expected prot function will be given by:
E(profit) = P (x)hL

t + [1  P (x)]lLt   wtL  tx (8)
The rst order conditions can be expressed as:
fP (x)h + [1  P (x)]lgL (1 ) = w (9)
P 0(x)L [h   l] =  (10)
We can think of the rst order conditions as the equality between marginal
products and marginal costs of inputs. Notice that the marginal product of
each input depends on the probability of having a high  which depends on
the amount of R&D that we use in the production function.
2.3 Credit Markets
Assume that each agent knows which type she belongs to (ex ante informa-
tion), but she has no information about the rest of the agents.9 This fact
produces the well-known adverse selection problem in the credit markets.
(Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981; Takayama, 1993)
9In particular, borrower quality is ex ante undetectable by the lender.
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The bevaviour of agents in credit markets is as follows. At time t young
lenders announce loan contracts consisting of three variables: (Rt, qt, t),
where Rt is the gross real interest rate, qt is the quantity of loan o¤ered by
lenders, and t is the probability to get a loan once a borrower has applied
for a credit contract. Lenders take other announcements (credit contracts)
as given.
At the beginning of period t, each potential borrower applies for a credit
contract that previously a lender has announced. The potential borrower
can only apply to one lender.10 With probability t, a type t borrower is
granted the loan. In this case, type i borrower will undertake the R&D
project. Otherwise, she has to sell the labour endowment to rms and to
store this consumption goods wt, obtaining a return iwt in the next period.
The lender allocates qit units of consumption good after he has received his
salary wt in order to provide the loan to the borrower. Obviously the loan
quantity and salaries must satisfy the constraint: qit  wt.
Considering that borrowers care just about consumption (recall that U b =
cb(2)), in the second period we can express the expected utility of a type i
borrower as:
piit(Qt+1  Rit)qit + (1  it)twt (11)
Equation (11) tells us that the probability it the borrower is granted
the loan. Then the borrower allocates the labour unit that she has and qit
units of consumption goods that she has borrowed. With probability pi, the
R&D project is successful and he obtains Qqit units of R&D (innovation).
These units of innovation earns a return of t+1 and borrowers have to pay
to lenders the quantity Ritqit.11
10The assumption of one-to-one matching between lenders and borrowers is not uncom-
mon in the literature (e.g. Bencivenga and Smith, 1993; Bose and Cothren, 1996, 1997;
Bose and Pereira, 2004) and is made in the present context largely to save on notation.
If a lender were to be approached by more than one borrower (each of whom is identi-
cal ex ante), then the lender would o¤er the contract on the same terms and divide her
loanable funds equally between borrowers. Given that there are equal numbers of lenders
and borrowers, the equilibrium outcome in each case would be equivalent to a one-to-one
matching. Alternatively, the assumption might be justied by appealing to the existence
of search costs which prohibit the breakup of any initial lenderborrower pairing.
11We need to assume that output is observable by everyone. Then lenders know about
the successful of R&D projects. If they do not pay back the loan they will be punished in
the next period.
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With probability (1 it) the loan is denied and the type i borrower sells
the unit labour receiving wt which she stores until next period receiving a
return of iwt. If the project results are unsuccessful, than the R&D output
is zero and nothing is received or repaid to the lender.
We assume that borrowers prefer to undertake the R&D project rather
than to sell their labour endowment to rms. Therefore equation (11) is
increasing in it. This implies that:
pi(Qt+1  Rit)qit  twt (12)
Expression (4) implies that high quality (low risk-type L) borrowers are
di¤erent from low ability borrowers (high risk-typeH ). Thus (RHt; qHt; Ht) 6=
(RLt; qLt; Lt). This implies that self-selection occurs among borrowers in
such a way that contract-loans should satisfy the following conditions:
pHHt(Qt+1 RHt)qHt+(1  it)Hwt pHLt(Qt+1 RLt)qLt+(1  Lt)Hwt
(13)
and
pLLt(Qt+1 RLt)qLt+(1  it)Lwt pLHt(Qt+1 RHt)qHt+(1  Ht)Lwt
(14)
These conditions mean that high ability borrowers will not accept credit
contracts under low ability borrowers conditions, and viceversa. Therefore
self-selection occurs. In this case, assuming that lenders have no incentives
to o¤er an alternate contract at any date,12 taking other contracts as given,
12This assumption is not without consequences. In fact, a major di¤erence between
models of nancial intermediation and growth, largely revolve around the treatment of the
timing of asymmetric information. A standard result in the literature (e.g. Bencivenga
and Smith, 1993; King and Levine, 1993b; Bose and Cothren, 1996) is that asymmetric
informations play a role in precontracting and intermediaries are endowed with the ability
to induce separation of heterogeneous borrowers by self-selection. However, as suggested by
more recent models, there could be postcontract incentives, especially if it is the borrower
who makes the rst move (by way of approaching a lender with a loan application),
therefore revealing additional information that the principal can use. Furthermore, there
can be postcontract incentive for agents to shirk or deceive (e.g. Morales 2003; Aghion
et al. 2005) but, as noted by Trew (2006), these moral hazard issues often simply add
another wedge between agents and rms, scaling down balanced growth rates.
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as well as t, we will have a Nash equilibrium in credit markets.
Also, we can see condition (13) as the condition that ensures that whoever
applies for [RHt; qHt; Ht] loan is certainly high risk. The contract is designed
to make them reveal their type.
Now let us see the position of lenders is. The expected prot function of
a lender could be expressed as:
E(profit)lender = ptRitqit   qit (15)
I assume that competition drives lenderseconomic prot to zero. Given
that pi (i = L, H) is the probability with which the R&D project is successful
(and so the lender is repaid), the zero-prot condition of the lender pins down
the lending rate as:
Rit =
1
pi
(16)
We need to remember that pL > pH , so that RL < RH . From the previous
conditions, we can see that for type H (high risk-low ability) borrower the
credit contract is not subject to self-selection because she is willing to pay a
higher interest rate than type L agent. In this case, lenders will compete for
such type of borrowers. To see this point, we can apply the same argument
for health insurance premiums. In this situation, we expect a higher risk for
people who are willing to pay higher premiums. However, companies compete
for these customers because of the fact that other people who choose a lower
premium do not ensure them that these people have lower risk. Health insur-
ance companies announce di¤erent type of contracts (high or low premium)
and customers will apply for them (in the same way that we have described
in the credit market). We have to notice that health insurance companies (as
lenders) do not know all about the quality of customers. Therefore, they will
try to compete for the customers that are willing to pay a higher premiums.
In fact, there are more restrictions to get a low-premium health insurance
than a high-premium health insurance. Following the previous argument, we
can see that the probability of high risk borrowers to get the credit is one
(Ht = 1).
And the assumption (12) implies that qHt = wt.
With respect to low-risk (high ability) borrowers, the equilibrium contract
is given by RLt = 1pL and should satisfy the self selection condition given by
(13). Then, substituting qHt = wt and Ht = 1 into expression (14) we have:
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qLt =
 
pHQt+1   1

wt   (1  Lt)Hwt
pHLt(Qt+1   (1=pL))
(17)
The previous value of qLt satises qLt  wt i¤
t  pHQt+1   1  H
pHQt+1   (pH=pL)  H
(18)
In equilibrium and considering assumption (4) we have
qLt = wt (19)
and
Lt =
pHQt+1   1  H
pHQt+1   (pH=pL)  H
 1 (20)
Now, lets examine the equilibrium conditions. We have to recall that all
agents act competitively in both the labour and the R&D markets.
Assuming that all borrowers (remember that 50% of all agents are lenders
and 50% are borrowers) with positive quantities of R&D become rms own-
ers, we can gure out the rms per capita:
0:5 [pH   (1  )Lt] (21)
Half of all agents are borrowers and a fraction  (high risk) receive credit
with probability one, resulting in pH successful R&D projects. We need to
add agents (low risk) of type (1-) in which case the number of successful
R&D projects will be given by the second term of equation (21).
The per capita supply of labour will be given by:
0:5 [1  (1  )(1  Lt)] (22)
Therefore the quantity of labour per rm (assuming that in equilibrium
all rms use the same quantity of labour) is:
Lt =
1  (1  )(1  Lt)
pH   (1  )pLLt (23)
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We can now substitute (23) into (10) and we have:
t = P
0(x) [h   l]

1  (1  )(1  Lt)
pH   (1  )pLLt

(24)
Therefore, equations (24) and (20) give us the equilibrium values of (t,
Lt) and once we have these values we have the equilibrium values for L
and also the expression for the rate of growth of R&D, since we know that
xt+1 = Qqt = Qwt. Substituting expression (9) into the previous expression
we get:
xt+1 = Q fP (xt)h + [1  P (xt)]lg L (1 ) (25)
At the equilibrium, we can rewrite the expression (10) in the following
way:
Lt =


P 0(x) [h   l]
  1

Using the previous expression, we can solve for x:
xt+1 = Q fP (x)h   [1  P (x)]lg 


P 0(x) [h   l]
  1
(1 )
(25)
Now we can substitute expression (23) into (25) Also we can consider a
linear density function [that comes from assumption (7)] for P (x) and in this
case we can rewrite expression (25) as follows:
xt+1
xt
= Q [(x)h    (x)l]

1  (1  )(1  Lt)
pH   (1  )Lt
 (1 )
(26)
where: (x) = P (x) and  (x) = 1  P (x).
From the previous expression we can take the derivative with respect to
the probability of getting the loan for low risk agents and we will obtain the
11
relationship between the rate of growth of R&D and credit rationing. We
have to notice that the probability of getting the loan for low risk agents is
also a function of some of the parameters that appear in the expression (26).
Therefore the relationship between credit rationing and the rate of growth
of R&D expenditures will be given by:
@ ln(xt+1=xt)
@L
@L
@(parameter)
It can be proved that the rst part is positive
@ ln(xt+1=xt)
@L
=  Q(1  )

1 + (1  )(1  L)
pH + (1  )LpL
 (2 )



(1  ) [pH + (1  )LpL]
[pH + (1  )LpL]2

 

(1  )pL [1 + (1  )(1  L)]
[pH + (1  )LpL]2

> 0
(27)
Hence, policy actions that can reduce credit rationing (increases on L)
will increase the rate of growth of R&D and consequently the rate of economic
growth. Notice that, at equilibria, the return on R&D will be constant and
the same will happen for the probability of low risk agents to get the loan
from lenders.
The slopes of equations (20) and (24) are given by:
@
@L (20)
=
[pHQ  (pH=pL)  H ]2
pHQ [1  (pH=pL)] > 0 (28)
@
@L (24)
=
 P 0(x)(h   l)(1  ) [pH + (1  ) pLLt]
[pH + (1  ) pLLt]2
 (1  )pLP 0(x)(h   l) [1 + (1  )]
[pH + (1  ) pLLt]2
< 0 (29)
Graphically:
Note that the maximum probability of getting a loan for low type risk
agents is one, which is indicated by the vertical dotted line (gure 1).
The next section exhibits the results obtained by comparative statics.
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3 Comparative Statics
It is easy to verify that  and L are di¤erentiable with respect to the
parameters of the model: Q, pH, pL, H , , h, l and . Therefore we can
analyze the e¤ects of changes of some of these parameters for equilibrium
rats of growth.
3.1 E¤ects of changing h
The consequences of increasing h, which increases nal output for low ability
agents, are depicted in picture 2. As we can see the locus dened by equation
(20) is not a¤ected, but the locus dened by equation (24) is a¤ected by
changes in h. The horizontal shift in that locus is given by:
@L
@h (d=0)
> 0
Therefore, increases in h implies increases in  and L. Moreover, we can
see from (24) that xt+1
xt
will be increased. We have to notice that increasing
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h reduces the gap that exists between low and high ability people which
means that the probability to get the loan for high risk agents will increase
or, in other words, credit rationing decreases. Also,  will increase. The
increase in h can be justied by a technological improvement that a¤ects
the production conditions for low ability ar high risk people.
If we consider an increase of h, the gap between high and low ability
agents will increase which implies that lenders will increase credit rationing.
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3.2 E¤ects of changing Q
Increases in Q represent an improvement in the process of converting con-
sumption goods and labour into R&D. The e¤ect is simply depicted in gure
3. As we can see clearly the locus dened by expression (24) is not a¤ected,
while the locus dened by equation (20) shift horizontally to the right. The
horizontal shift is given by:
@L
@Q (d=0)
> 0
while
@L
@pL (dL=0)
= 0
As it is apparent from equation (26), xt+1
xt
will be increased, which leads
to increased rates of growth of R&D. As we can see in gure 3, increases in
Q imply an increase in L which means a reduction of credit rationing. It
also induces a reduction on .
Although human capital is not explicitly present in the previous model we
can think in improvements in human capital which will lead to a more e¢ cient
way to convert consumption goods and labour into R&D. In other words we
can justify increases in Q because of improvements in human capital.
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3.3 E¤ects of changing pL
An increase in pL leads to a shift in the locus given by equations (20) and
(24). The shift will be given by:
@L
@pL (d=0)
 0
@
@pL (dL=0)
 0
Increase in pL represent an improvement in type L investment projects.
In other words the probability of being successful in the production of R&D
for high ability people. Here, we have to notice that if pL increases, RL
decreases, which implies that the adverse selection problem will lead to rise
the credit rationing.
Besides the previous e¤ect, we have to consider that the increase in pL,
can induce an increase in  and that will induce a decrease in the rate of
growth on R&D.
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4 Concluding remarks
Many economists agree that credit rationing reduces the level of economic
activity. The key point in the present theoretical exercise is to show that
credit rationing a¤ects the rate of growth since it a¤ects the level of R&D and
this type of investment is nanced just by borrowings. I feel it is important
to emphasize the R&D activity, since it has some special characteristics. The
main characteristic is the fact that it cannot be used as a collateral to ensure
a loan. Thus, when credit rationing increases, we can expect that the activity
that is more a¤ected is the R&D activity.
In addition, the model lends itself to the use of comparative statics and
the consequences of di¤erent policies are analyzed. In this sense, the model
suggests that changes the improve the ability of the high-risk group of bor-
rowers will induce a decrease in credit rationing and therefore it will lead to
an increase in the rate of economic growth. In other words, measures that
tend to reduce the gap between the ability of individuals will help to reduce
credit rationing.
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